



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 19

What Is the Score on Nuclear Tests?

by Neal Stanford

WASHINGTON—For over six months the United States, Britain and the U.S.S.R. have been meeting at Geneva in an effort to negotiate a nuclear-test ban. Now that these negotiations have been resumed on June 8, it is useful to report on their progress, modest as it may seem.

Actually, some 17 articles of a draft treaty have been agreed on, although these articles contain only minor concessions by both sides and generally touch only on procedural matters. The big issues have yet to be tackled or, rather, resolved. The Russians still insist on a nearly airtight veto over control and inspection. They still believe—or claim—that all that is really needed is a treaty to end testing. But since the West will not accept an unpoliced agreement, Moscow is willing, however reluctantly, to make moves—and a few concessions—toward a system of inspection and control.

The Russians came to the conference table on October 31, 1958 proposing two treaties: one, to be signed immediately, which would end testing on the promise of the three powers; the other, to be signed later, which would set up a control system. The British and

Americans said, "No, thank you; there must be one agreement including a vetoless control system."

This argument went on for nearly a month. Then, on November 28, the U.S.S.R. issued a long propaganda blast against the West about Berlin, but finally accepted the one-treaty position of the West. After that there was considerable activity and some progress. Before the delegates recessed on December 19 for a Christmas vacation, they had agreed on four articles for a draft treaty. One of the articles affirmed their willingness to stop tests themselves and not abet other nations in testing. A second stated their willingness to cooperate with a control system to be established. A third described the contemplated control system, which was to consist of an administrator, a control commission and a conference of the parties to the treaty. The fourth stated that the control commission was to be made up of seven nations—three of them the Big Three, which were to be permanent members, and the other four to be elected for two-year terms by the conference of the signatories.

With that bit of work tucked under their belts the conferees went home for well-deserved

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holidays. They reconvened on January 5, 1959, and it was then that the United States submitted its new data on underground blasts which nearly disrupted the conference. This data, based on studies made by American scientists during the Hardtack tests held in Nevada in the fall of 1958, indicated that it was much more difficult to identify underground blasts than the scientific experts of the Big Three had believed at their Geneva conference in the summer of 1958; and that there were about ten times as many underground tremors, earthquakes and shocks, requiring investigation each year than had been assumed. The question was not how to detect but how to identify these various blasts. Moscow charged the United States with trying to back out on the talks, or torpedo them. Washington, however, stuck to its point—that it was next to impossible to distinguish earthquake waves from nuclear waves underground, and that there would have to be on-the-spot inspection of underground tremors beyond anything previously contemplated.

The Controversial Issues

About this same time the United States dropped its insistence that a test ban be linked to evidence of progress in other fields of disarmament. For the next two months, then, talks centered mainly on three issues: (1) the veto power and how extensive it should be; (2) how the control posts would be staffed; and (3) how the on-site inspection teams would be made up and operate.

The Russians, as was expected,

wanted a veto over practically everything. The United States insisted there could be no veto over the daily operations of the inspection system—although Washington and London did accept a big power veto over treaty amendments. The U.S.S.R., as was also expected, wanted the staff of the control posts to be nationals of the country where the posts were located. (The scientific experts the previous summer had agreed there should be 180 posts scattered over the world.) The United States said that the top third of a post's staff should be nationals of the other two Big Three; the middle third should be citizens of other countries; the bottom third could be citizens of the country where the post was located.

After a lot of bickering the Russians agreed to let one or two "outsiders" be attached to a control post, but only as "observers." After some more bickering they agreed to make it four or five, but still with no authority. It soon became clear that Moscow and Washington were at loggerheads about on-site inspection teams. The United States wanted them to be automatic, international and permanent; Moscow wanted them to be national, *ad hoc*, and subject to the veto. On March 19 the delegates adjourned in a seemingly hopeless deadlock.

U.S. Phased Proposal

They reconvened on April 13, and it was then that the United States came up with its phased agreement proposal, suggested in a letter from President Eisenhower to Premier Khrushchev. Because of Moscow's

charges that on-site inspection teams were only espionage agents, Washington had concluded that Moscow would never accept them. So Eisenhower suggested trying to reach agreement a step at a time, by banning atmospheric tests (up to 50 kilometers), but postponing efforts to agree on underground and outer space tests.

Khrushchev replied by proposing a limit on on-site inspection. This came as a surprise to everyone except Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who had recently talked it over with the Soviet premier in Moscow. However, the limit was so small and indefinite that the United States could not accept it. For example, Moscow proposed that "one" permanent inspection team be set up. But with some 1,500 unidentified "tremors" to be investigated each year, according to the 1958 data gathered by American scientists, one team could hardly scratch the surface of its assignment. The Russians also have not made clear how the veto would work on the dispatch of inspection teams, on their reports, on the instruments of detection used at control posts, on interpretation of findings, and so on.

Since Khrushchev's reply on April 25, both President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan have sent the Soviet premier further letters, again pressing for an end to atmospheric tests while working to end all nuclear weapons tests. They have indicated a willingness to negotiate over inspection post personnel. And they have repeated the need for on-site inspection of all seismic occurrences that could be caused by

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clandestine underground explosions.

What Khrushchev has done is to buy just a small part of the West's proposal—that there be a joint scientific study of ways of detecting high-altitude space tests. Atmospheric tests can be checked pretty accurately without much of an on-spot policing system because of fallout around the world; and fear of increasing fallout makes governments particularly anxious to stop these tests. Underwater testing, too, can be checked fairly well without infringing on any country's sovereignty. Underground testing, however, is far more difficult to check, and this is the form of checking that the Russians con-

tinue most violently to oppose.

Khrushchev's concession, then, is not quite as impressive as Moscow has tried to make it seem, although it is a step forward on the road to agreement. Therefore the West is willing to accept it. At the same time, it is pressing Moscow to accept the other parts of its proposal: underground test studies and a conference on standards needed to detect possible violations of any test ban embodied in an agreement.

There has been talk that if the Big Four foreign ministers at Geneva could not agree on a summit conference because of a deadlock on Berlin and Germany, they might propose

one because of progress made in the Geneva talks on a test ban. But this would be quite a different summit meeting from that which has been hitherto envisaged. It would have to be a Big Three, not a Big Four meeting, for France, which does not yet manufacture nuclear bombs, is not participating in the Geneva test-ban talks. Moreover, the foreign ministers are actually meeting in Geneva to discuss Germany, not a test ban.

Progress on a test ban could help to carry the Big Four to a summit meeting, but it could not do so all by itself. Germany is still considered the major summit issue, although not necessarily the only one.



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

Geneva: Optimism or Pessimism?

The dramatic conjunction of events which brought the May 27 funeral of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the day when Premier Khrushchev's November 27 ultimatum on Berlin was to have expired marked a turning-point in the Geneva foreign ministers' conference. Already after the customary skirmishes and mutual recriminations at the Palais des Nations, the Big Four were reported on May 21 to be settling down to secret negotiations. Their journey to Mr. Dulles' funeral sealed this decision.

To the outside observer—and this included the 1,200 members of the world press assembled for the occasion on the shores of Lake Geneva—the conferees on Berlin, Germany and European security seemed to be standing pat on previously defined positions. Yet changes in attitudes, which might perhaps be best described as psychological adjustments to new circumstances, seemed to be in the making. The evaluation of these changes, and of their possible

contribution to the easing of East-West tensions, depended on whether the observer was an optimist or a pessimist.

Outwardly, the first two weeks of the Geneva conference reaffirmed the deadlock between the West and the U.S.S.R. The West offered a package deal, including Berlin, German unification and a European security agreement; the U.S.S.R. insisted on individual solutions for the various problems under discussion. The West called for a unified Berlin under four-power control; the U.S.S.R., for continued partition and virtual ouster of the Western allies from the city—with the possibility of a UN force in Berlin, which was rejected by United Nations Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld. The West made a settlement conditional on the unification of the two Germanys through free elections; the U.S.S.R. indicated its preference for a divided Germany. The West urged a peace treaty with a unified Germany; the U.S.S.R., a peace treaty with the two Germanys now,

as separate sovereign states. The West offered a united Germany a free choice between alignment with NATO, the Warsaw Pact bloc or neutrality, with special security arrangements to be made in case Germany joins either of the two blocs; the U.S.S.R. insisted on the neutralization of Germany. The West proposed that foreign troops in Europe be recalled at the request of the individual nations; the U.S.S.R. demanded unconditional troop withdrawal.

Three New Trends

This was a confrontation of positions for the most part long familiar. But underneath the official presentations of the four foreign ministers, three new trends appeared to be emerging.

1. *Acceptance of Status Quo in Eastern Europe.* The West gave no indication at the Geneva conference that it was prepared to challenge the existing situation in Eastern Europe.

(Continued on page 151)



Should U.S. Aid Program Be Changed?

Excerpts from the address of Senator Jacob K. Javits, Republican of New York, made at the luncheon discussion on "Congress and Its Contribution to Foreign Policy" sponsored by the Foreign Policy Association at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel as part of its 40th Anniversary celebration on November 11, 1958.

The next Congress will have to decide whether our country is to launch a massive trade and aid offensive or accept further contraction of the free world. This is the lesson of the past few years.

In the struggle over the so-called neutralist bloc of new and underdeveloped nations, the capability for bringing about material improvement in the living conditions in these nations on the part of the free world will represent a major element in their adherence to the free world. . . .

To accomplish what we must do abroad will require materially increased public investment through the Development Loan Fund, the Surplus Disposal Program for agricultural commodities (Public Law 480), and the Import-Export Bank. It will require a material increase in the loanable capital of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation; the organization of an international development authority to enlist public investment activities of other countries including our NATO partners; and implementation of the United Nations Special Assistance Fund. It will also require a material increase of new United States private overseas investment in the magnitude

of about twice what it is today—to \$7.5 billion per year.

Excerpts from an address by Representative Chester Bowles, Democrat of Connecticut, as printed in the Congressional Record of March 11, 1959.

I suggest that our present economic efforts are failing on four counts.

Four Failures

First, our stated purposes of foreign aid fail to do justice to our real goals in world affairs. More basically, they fail to take adequately into account the new dimensions of the international political situation and therefore the new dimensions of peace.

Second, instead of focusing our efforts on the political and economic forces which I have described . . . our aid program is overbalanced much too far toward the military.

Third, because we have failed to distinguish between the needs and present capabilities of the 60-odd countries receiving our aid, large sums have been misdirected and even wasted.

Fourth, our financial commitment and our administrative performance are both grossly incommensurate with the challenge.

These shortcomings are not sudden or new. I have called attention to them in the past and so have other observers.

They have now become acute. It is no longer possible to gloss over them or to pretend that they are unimportant. . . .

Our foreign-aid program has not always suffered from such poverty of

purposes. There is an important lesson to be learned from a quick backward look at lend lease and the Marshall plan.

We all know that history does not repeat itself, and that the success of these earlier programs does not mean they are infallible models for 1959. But the underlying conception and operating methods of these programs are instructive. Indeed I believe they may hold a key that will open new doors in our search for a more reliable approach to our economic relations with the underdeveloped nations. . . .

Secretary Marshall assured the world that United States aid policy was not directed against any country, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. . . .

Here was an eloquent expression of hope that by cooperative action nations could build a better future for themselves.

Here was a call for a comprehensive plan for European economic reconstruction. Although American aid was to be an integral and essential part, we were counting on Europe itself to push its own resources to the limit.

Not An Easy Task

Our mutual security program today lacks these clear purposes and operating principles. If we are to achieve our crucially important objectives, we must return to them.

I do not pretend that this will be easy. These principles must be applied in parts of the world where most governments are far less well prepared for effective cooperation.

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Excerpts from the Citizens Foreign Aid Committee's report of April 27, 1959, urging termination of the mutual security programs within three years. The chairman of that committee, Mr. Walter Harnischfeger, and the National Director, Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers, USA (ret.), submitted testimony in opposition to foreign aid during the April hearings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs regarding extension of the mutual security programs.

Americans are crusaders. It is our American trait to endeavor to create others in our own image. Whether or not other peoples want to reflect our image fails to deaden our zeal. Through foreign aid we have attempted to superimpose our modern, highly industrialized, fast-moving system upon underdeveloped countries with less complex living standards, slower tempo and different cultures. It has taken us 175 years to reach our present standard of living. Foreign aid seeks to lift underdeveloped countries to a parity with us in a decade or two. It is most unrealistic.

Foreign aid reflects a patronizing attitude toward foreign peoples. It is a sly attempt to buy their allegiance, which is presumed to be for sale.

In the recipient countries, our foreign-aid program results in confusion, misunderstanding and sometimes chaos. After nearly 15 years of foreign aid we are probably the most disliked nation in the world!

There is also a human principle which strongly influences the reaction of recipients to our foreign-aid program. If one country is made a recipient, how can aid to others be denied? If one recipient is granted more than others, all recipients then clamor for more. The war-devastated Philippines, our trusted wartime ally, is now understandably in turmoil for the reason that others less deserving are higher on our foreign-aid totem pole.

Foreign Aid Creates Peril

Unless foreign aid is soon terminated, our country faces economic peril. This peril is inevitable because neither this nor any other Congress

will reduce or restrain spending at home so long as it votes colossal foreign handouts.

Our Congressmen know that, so long as they dissipate billions of dollars overseas, to be re-elected they must also continue expensive domestic benefits. Foreign aid is a street without end—unless the street is barricaded. If long continued, it will result in an ever-expanding bureaucracy of careerists dedicated to passing out American taxpayers' dollars all over the globe.

The fate of our foreign-aid program is a matter which the American people must decide now. No matter how much we spend, it is clear that we cannot buy world leadership and good will. If we are to lead, we can lead only by example. We cannot force our image upon others. We must resume our progress and pursuit of liberty under the Constitution. Then and only then will others respect us. . . . The following facts are inescapable:

Inescapable Facts

1. That our Government intends that foreign aid shall be continuous and global.

2. That the threat of Communist aggression rules out our continuing to dispense lavish foreign aid when our own economy is threatened and our defenses are inadequate.

3. That in a number of recipient countries our foreign aid helps to strengthen political systems hostile to our own.

4. That our foreign aid speeds rather than retards the growth of communism; it inflates our economy; it is partially responsible for the

alarming flight of gold from our control; it is destroying our foreign markets and increasing unemployment among American workers.

5. That by the very nature of the foreign aid we extend it must be inefficient and wasteful.

6. That our governmental foreign-aid program is unsound in principle.

Proposed Remedies

To remedy these conditions we recommend the following:

1. That our traditional generous private charity and governmental grants to relieve disaster be continued; that we encourage the expansion of our private missionary efforts.

2. That in countries which we are morally obligated to defend and which are directly threatened with Red aggression, military assistance—for the time being—should be continued but on a realistic basis.

3. That foreign aid which directly or indirectly promotes governments that are hostile to our constitutional concepts of government be terminated immediately.

4. That so long as governmental foreign aid is continued the recipient should pay a part of the cost of the proposed project; that our aid should terminate when the conditions on which that request is based have been remedied; that private technical, scientific and educational assistance be extended only to friendly peoples who seek our aid on a cash or loan basis.

5. That until foreign aid is terminated, the Congress take steps properly to exercise close supervision and control over the manner in which all foreign-aid funds are being spent; that all future economic aid, plus what can be salvaged from unexpended foreign-aid funds, be diverted to and handled by the Export-Import Bank.

6. That the \$3.9 billion requested by the President for the fiscal year 1960 be reduced \$2 billion, and that

each year thereafter foreign aid be substantially reduced until terminated within three years.

Members of this committee are not isolationists. They believe in the principle that commercial intercourse is of great importance to stabilize the world. They support the expansion of international trade by route of the free enterprise system. They subscribe to a reasonable expansion of sound foreign investments and loans on the business level.

Bowles

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than Europe was in 1948. Our ties with many of these governments are less close. But we must take into account the same variables on a new world stage.

We must rethink the nature of the present crisis, the stakes involved, the governments and the people concerned, and above all, the available areas of vital mutual interests.

This is not simply a problem of semantics. Our new purposes must be reflected in our day-to-day actions, in our policies, in our appropriations and in our administration. Unless the words we speak are reflected accurately in the things we do, we will continue to blunder.

Excerpts from the comments of Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on his amendments to the proposed Mutual Security Act of 1959, as printed in the Congressional Record, April 24.

Mr. President, many of us who have long been supporters of the mutual security program also have been critical of some of the policies governing that program. Some of us wrote to the President of the United States after the conclusion of the last session of the Congress and asked that a reappraisal of the program be made, along certain lines which we sug-

gested, prior to the submission to the Congress of the fiscal year 1960 mutual security program. My colleagues and I have been concerned that military considerations have played too great a part in the formulation of the program. This is not of course necessarily to say that the amounts requested for military assistance are too large, because modern weapons are very expensive. It is rather that the philosophy of the program is founded too much, we think, on the idea that the danger to the United States today is largely a military one, and that the threat from communism is largely a military threat. Many of us feel that in many parts of the world the most serious danger from communism cannot be met through military means. We are also of the opinion that there are serious problems for the United States arising from the economic and social revolutions in Asia and Africa which arise irrespective of communism and that there is a need today for a more adequate response on the part of the United States. . . .

Five Amendments Proposed

In the absence of leadership on the part of the President, those of us in the Congress must do the best we can to fashion the mutual security program to meet today's needs. This is the purpose of the amendments which I have introduced. These amendments deal with only part of the need for changes. I do not pretend that I have dealt with all the problems. I am sure that other senators will suggest other amendments to cure other ills.

The first amendment is an attempt to clarify the purpose of the mutual security program. The tone of the existing policy language in the Mutual Security Act of 1954 is entirely too military in nature. Other important United States objectives have thereby suffered. My amendment retains the

existing statement of purpose in the act but would add additional policy guidance which would place our economic and technical assistance in a more appropriate context.

Mr. President, the second amendment which I submitted deals with the important subject of the military force goals which the United States helps other nations to work toward. As those of us who are familiar with the program know, once these military force goals are fixed, a great many political and economic consequences follow. Pakistan is an example of a country which, in the opinion of many, has been burdened with a military effort so great that its economic development has been retarded and its relations with its neighbors poisoned. My amendment is designed to inject political and economic analysis more adequately into the process of fixing the military force goals.

Increase in Loan Fund

My third amendment would provide a more adequate basis for financing the Development Loan Fund. This amendment is not really new. The language is the same except for different figures as that which the Administration submitted and which the Senate adopted two years ago. It proposes that the Development Loan Fund be financed on a banking basis like the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. My amendment would add capital to the fund over a period of five years at the rate of \$1.5 billion each year. These are large sums, Mr. President, but the need is very great. India alone can absorb \$1 billion a year in outside capital.

The need for capital for economic development in Asia and Africa and Latin America can be measured in various ways, but the need cannot be measured accurately. I should point

But that capital investment is already proceeding to these areas.

De-emphasis of Military Aid

My fourth amendment is designed to provide the President with greater power to counteract the economic offensive of the Communist countries by increasing his authority to transfer military assistance funds to economic purposes. My amendment would give the President the ability to transfer 30 percent rather than 10 percent of military aid funds to nonmilitary uses. The amendment would be permissive; the President could take advantage of it or not as he sees fit. Another reason for this amendment is the possibility that the full report of the Draper committee to the President may reflect a somewhat deeper penetration into the policy issues of the mutual security program. If that happens the President may need increased authority to transfer funds.

Mr. President, the fifth amendment which I am submitting today would clarify the authority of the chief of United States diplomatic missions to provide a political and economic judgment of military recommendations sent to Washington by the senior military representatives of the United States in the country. The amendment is designed to give the ambassador greater control over the recommendations for military aid originating from his so-called country team.

Mr. President, I do not believe that these amendments are the last word. As I said before, other problems remain untouched and I expect that other senators will have worthwhile ideas on what to do about them. I offer these amendments early, well before the Committee on Foreign Relations begins its hearings on the mutual security program, in order that the committee may have the benefit of comments on them by my colleagues, by the Executive branch, and

by members of the public. If any other senators desire to sponsor these amendments with me, I shall welcome such support.

(Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John F. Kennedy joined Senator Fulbright in sponsoring his amendments.)

Spotlight

(Continued from page 147)

On the contrary, the government of West Germany, which under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had hitherto been adamant in refusing to recognize the Communist governments of Eastern Europe, made known on May 20 that it was prepared to establish diplomatic relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, to sign nonaggression pacts with the first two and to consider such pacts with the other three if they so desire.

This decision represents a major change in the policy of West Germany, which had previously refused recognition to any country, except the U.S.S.R., that maintains diplomatic relations with East Germany, and had threatened to break relations with any country that established such relations—actually breaking off relations with Yugoslavia when Belgrade recognized the Pankow government in 1957.

Bonn's Shift Significant

Bonn's shift, which had been urged for some time by the West German Foreign Office but had been opposed by Adenauer, portends several important changes in the European political scene. First, it reflects a growing understanding on the part of the West Germans that the U.S.S.R. and its Eastern European neighbors, which suffered severely from German conquest, have a legitimate need for reassurance against their future resort to war. What is called for now is a comparable understanding on the part of Moscow that the West, in-

cluding West Germany, has a legitimate need for reassurance against future Russian pressures. Second, Bonn in effect accepts the political *status quo* in Eastern Europe. Such acceptance by the West has been a major objective of the U.S.S.R., alarmed by uprisings in East Germany and Hungary in the post-Stalin period of relaxation. Third, Bonn's new policy indicates that it will not seek to change by force the present German-Polish border on the Oder and Neisse rivers, fixed in the Potsdam agreement of 1945, which is regarded as final by the Poles, but as provisional only by the West Germans and the Western allies pending the conclusion of a final German peace settlement.

From the point of view of the pessimist, acceptance of the Eastern European *status quo* represents a victory for the U.S.S.R. From the point of view of the optimist, however, this acceptance, over the long run, will help to relax Moscow's fears and will make it possible for the Eastern European countries, particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, to become less dependent on the U.S.S.R., which has hitherto been for them a shield against the possible resurgence of German militarism.

2. Relations Between the Two Germanys. Bonn's new policy on Eastern Europe does not include recognition of East Germany, which the West Germans regard as a "puppet" of the U.S.S.R. It is difficult to escape the conclusion, however, that, by no longer vetoing the recognition of East Germany by other countries, Bonn itself helps to enhance that area's claim to political independence. While Bonn has steadfastly refused to have political relations with Pankow, it has been increasingly developing trade, cultural and technical relations of all kinds with the East Germans. Moreover, any settlement of the Berlin problem will require

participation by the East Germans if, as the Russians have indicated since November 1958, the U.S.S.R. should transfer its rights in Berlin to East Germany. And the seating of East German representatives, as well as West German representatives, in the Big Four Geneva conference room at the close of "the battle of the tables" represented at least a symbolic victory for Moscow's thesis that East Germany is a sovereign state—a widely publicized victory whose significance has not been lost on public opinion in Europe.

From the point of view of the pessimist, any move toward recognition of the East German state is a dangerous concession to the U.S.S.R. From the point of view of the optimist, some kind of conversations about the political future are bound to take place between Bonn and Pankow. Such conversations are in fact envisaged in the West's plan for German reunification, which proposes the establishment of a commission of West and East German representatives to further contacts between the two Germanys and, eventually, to draft an electoral law.

3. *Long-Term Negotiations.* The view is gaining ground that the complexities of Berlin, Germany and a European security agreement will require long-term negotiations, with not just one summit meeting, but several, in prospect. This is the view

which British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had stressed in his reports to the United States, French and West German governments after his visit to the U.S.S.R., and which, it is believed, Sir Winston Churchill expounded to President Eisenhower.

What the West now seeks, according to James Reston of *The New York Times*, is a "standstill" agreement with the U.S.S.R. to leave Berlin as it is, not just until a summit meeting takes place this summer, but until after a second summit meeting is held in 1960.

From the point of view of the pessimist, prolonged negotiations may redound to the benefit of the Soviet dictatorship, which is not hampered in its foreign policy by the need to reconcile divergent ideas—as the Western democracies are when they seek to maintain a united stand. From the point of view of the optimist, time, which is already bringing a greater sense of historical perspective, may produce new ideas about the central issue of the Big Four conversations—which is still how to integrate a reunited Germany into Europe without creating new dangers of German aggression. Now that the West Germans themselves officially recognize the seriousness of this issue, the way may be gradually cleared toward a settlement acceptable to both sides.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

FPA Bookshelf

ASIA

The Leaf and the Flame, by Margaret Parton (New York, Knopf, 1959, \$3.95). The former *Herald Tribune* correspondent in India, now an associate editor of *The Ladies' Home Journal* (and a member of the FPA Editorial Advisory Committee) is the author of this exceptionally perceptive and balanced book, full of fresh insights on India.

Communism in India, by Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959, \$10.00). The most exhaustive and up-to-date study of the organization, program and activities of the Indian Communist party: Professor Overstreet is a member of the Political Science Department at Swarthmore College. Professor Windmiller has been on the staff of the Center for South Asia Studies at Berkeley. Their conclusion (reached of course before Tibet) is that "the CPI is neither monolithic nor unchanging. . . . Up to now its nature has been more Communist than Indian. . . . Should it become even a little more Indian, it will be truly a force to be reckoned with."

The Little World of Laos, by Oden Meeker (New York, Scribner's, 1959, \$4.50). An interesting commentary on this ancient Indochinese country by the first representative of CARE in Laos. Excellent photographs by Homer Page help to illustrate the carefree, leisurely life of the Laotians, which the author describes.

REFERENCE BOOKS

Among year books which make useful reference material are the 1959 issues of *The Europa Year Book* (London, Europa Publication Ltd., \$22.00)—a comprehensive guide to European and Europe-based organizations, as well as economic and statistical data about every European country; *The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who* (London, Burke's Peerage Limited, \$25.00)—contains similar information to the above volume, as well as a section on the United Nations and a "Who's Who" of the world; *Britain: An Official Handbook* (New York, British Information Services, \$3.92)—answers all conceivable questions on the United Kingdom.

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